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A quantum approach to 
homomorphic encryption
Si-Hui Tanͷ, Joshua A. Kettlewellͷ, Yingkai Ouyangͷ, Lin Chen͸,͹ & Joseph F. Fitzsimonsͷ,ͺ
Encryption schemes often derive their power from the properties of the underlying algebra on the 
symbols used. Inspired by group theoretic tools, we use the centralizer of a subgroup of operations 
to present a private-key quantum homomorphic encryption scheme that enables a broad class of 
quantum computation on encrypted data. The quantum data is encoded on bosons of distinct species in 
distinct spatial modes, and the quantum computations are manipulations of these bosons in a manner 
independent of their species. A particular instance of our encoding hides up to a constant fraction of the 
information encrypted. This fraction can be made arbitrarily close to unity with overhead scaling only 
polynomially in the message length. This highlights the potential of our protocol to hide a non-trivial 
amount of information, and is suggestive of a large class of encodings that might yield better security.
he discovery that quantum systems could be harnessed to process data in a fundamentally new way has led to 
the burgeoning ield of quantum information processing. his approach to computation holds the promise of 
more eicient algorithms for a variety of tasks including integer factorization1, search2 and quantum simula-
tion3. However, quantum information processing has also found applications in the area of cryptography, which 
has been a focus of the ield since the discovery of secure quantum key distribution protocols by Bennett and 
Brassard4, and Ekert5. he information theoretic security of these protocols stands in stark contrast to the reliance 
of classical key agreement protocols on assumptions of computational hardness, and indeed a major goal of quan-
tum cryptography research is to replicate and extend the functionality present in existing classical schemes while 
providing stronger, information theoretic, security guarantees.
In the world of classical cryptography, a central topic in recent years has been the study of homomorphic 
encryption6–8. Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption which allows data processing to be performed 
on encrypted data without access to the encryption key. In general, a homomorphic encryption system is com-
posed of four components: a key generation algorithm, an encryption algorithm that encrypts the data using the 
generated key, a decryption algorithm that decrypts the data using the key, and an evaluation algorithm which is 
used to process the data without decryption. hus homomorphic encryption allows for secret data to be processed 
by third parties without allowing them access to the plaintext. Ater decryption, the plaintext output reveals 
the processed data. A scheme is termed fully-homomorphic if it allows for arbitrary processing of the encrypted 
data. Although the idea for homomorphic encryption has existed for some time6, it was not until 2009 that a 
fully-homomorphic encryption scheme was discovered by Gentry7. Gentry’s scheme is only computationally 
secure, relying on the assumed hardness of certain worst-case problems over ideal lattices, and the sparse subset 
sum problem, although the condition requiring ideal lattices was later dropped8.
Recent successes in quantum cryptography in inding information theoretically secure protocols for blind 
computation9–14 and veriiable computing15–18, problems closely linked to homomorphic encryption, have moti-
vated the question of whether quantum mechanics allows for information theoretically secure homomorphic 
encryption schemes. Indeed, a number of attempts have been made to ind a quantum analogue of homomorphic 
encryption19–24, however these attempts have inevitably run into a barrier. It is now known that it is not possible 
to achieve perfect information theoretic security while enabling arbitrary processing of encrypted data, unless the 
size of the encoding is allowed to grow exponentially25. As a result, some schemes19–22 have required interaction 
between parties to enable deterministic computation. hese requirements parallel those of blind quantum com-
putation which hides both the data and the computation being done on it. Another scheme by Broadbent and 
Jefery23 allow the evaluation of circuits of low T-gate complexity by building on a classical fully homomorphic 
encryption scheme. Incorporating ideas from the garden-hose model of computation, Dulek, Schafner, and 
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Speelman24 expanded this scheme to allow the evaluation of polynomial-depth circuits. However, these schemes 
are dependent on computational assumptions, necessary for the underlying classical homomorphic encryption 
schemes, for their security. he question then remains as to whether information theoretically secure homomor-
phic encryption is possible without expanding the deinition to include interactive protocols. One might consider 
implementing a quantum one-time pad on the data, which takes the data to the maximally mixed state. One could 
perform arbitrary quantum computations on the encrypted data, and then construct a decryption algorithm that 
depends on the computation performed19. However homomorphic encryption schemes need to satisfy compact-
ness: the decryption operation must be less computationally expensive than the evaluation on the encrypted data. 
The Achilles heel of such a scheme is that it fails to satisfy compactness. A first step in the direction of 
non-interactive quantum protocols with compactness was presented by Rohde et al.26 for a restricted model of 
quantum computation known as the BosonSampling model27 which is non-universal. Furthermore, the scheme 
ensures only that the encoded information and the accessible information difer by an amount proportional to 
mlog
2
 bits when m bits are encrypted, which is a relatively weak security guarantee. An information-theoretically 
secure scheme that allows for processing of encrypted data beyond BosonSampling is not known to date.
In this paper, we present a private-key homomorphic encryption protocol that supports a broad class of com-
putations, including and extending beyond BosonSampling, while providing certain information theoretic secu-
rity guarantees by bounding the information accessible to an adversary. While this is not a standard cryptographic 
measure of security, it provides a reasonable measure of privacy in a standalone setting which is free of computa-
tional assumptions. However, stronger security deinition based on trace distance exists28. he protocol we pres-
ent ensures a gap between the information accessible to an adversary and actual information encoded that grows 
as mlog2(d/m) + m(log2)
−1 bits when m dlog
2
 bits are encrypted using m d-level systems. his is a signiicantly 
stronger security guarantee than that ofered by the scheme presented by Rohde et al.26. We present our results in 
three parts. First we present a general approach to homomorphic encryption stemming from the group theoretic 
structure of quantum operations. We then present a family of operations which allow for a broad class of compu-
tations to be performed on encrypted data for a range of encryption schemes satisfying certain symmetry con-
straints. This class of quantum computations can be thought of as manipulations of bosons in a manner 
independent of their internal state. he computation begins with a set of bosons, each in a unique spatial mode 
with all modes occupied, with the internal state of each boson specifying the input to the computation. he com-
putation consists of manipulating the spatial degree of freedom of the bosons, in such a way that operations 
depend only on the number of bosons in a mode and not their internal state. At the end of the computation, both 
the spatial and internal degree of freedom of the bosons are measured. his model includes BosonSampling, using 
the encoding due to Rohde et al.26, but extends far beyond it due to a much richer group structure of the set of 
allowed operations. We conclude with a concrete encoding which supports such computations while satisfying 
the necessary symmetry constraints and show that it limits the accessible information as described above.
Results
Group theoretic approach. We approach the problem of creating a homomorphic encryption scheme via 
the most naive route: we try to construct a set of encryption operations which commute with the operations used 
to implement computation on the encrypted data. However, this approach immediately encounters a barrier 
when applied to the case of universal computation. In such a case the computation operations form a group, either 
the unitary group in the case of quantum computation or the symmetric group in the case of classical reversible 
computation, which does not usually commute with other operations. Indeed, any irreducible representation 
of these groups only commutes with operators proportional to the identity, precluding non-trivial encryption. 
However, for reducible representations of these groups, there can exist non-trivial operators which commute with 
the entire group. his provides a natural route to constructing a homomorphic encryption scheme which allows 
the evaluation of operators chosen from some group G on encrypted data, by choosing a representation of the 
group with a non-trivial centralizer. he set of operations used to perform the encryption must be chosen as a 
subset of this centralizer. While it is not immediately obvious that encryption operations chosen this way should 
actually be able to hide information, the BosonSampling scheme presented in Rohde et al.26 provides an example 
of such an encoding where a non-trivial amount of information is hidden.
Representation of computation. Our protocol uses m identical bosonic particles; each particle has a spa-
tial degree of freedom limited to a inite number of modes x = 1, … , m and an internal state α = 0, … , d − 1 (see 
Fig. 1). We design our scheme such that the encryption operations afect only the internal states of the particles, 
and the computation operations afect only the spatial modes of the particles. Since the input to the computation 
is supplied using the internal states of the particles, but the computation is performed using manipulation of only 
spatial modes, it may appear that the input does not afect the computation. his is not the case, however, since the 
internal states of the particles afect the computation by altering interference between particles.
Each particle can be represented as a state α
x
 created out from a vacuum state vac  via a creation operator 
α
ˆ
†ax , , with α = αˆ
†a vac
x x ,
. he bosonic creation operators 
α
ˆ
†ax ,  and βˆ
†ay ,  commute, and satisfy the orthogonality 
condition δ δ=α β α β
†a a[ , ]x y x y, , , , . Note that we make no assumption on the internal states of the m particles, any 
two particles can have the same or diferent internal states. Explicitly, the initial state of our scheme is
α α… = ⊗ … ⊗α αˆ ˆ
† †a a vac , (1)m m m1, , 1 1m1
which we denote as α→  for short, where 'α α α→ = … ∈( , , )m dm1  is our plaintext. Since the values of α1, … , αm 
are selected from the integers from 0 to d − 1, there are dm possible orthogonal input states, spanning a complex 
Euclidean space  ⊗( )d m.
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he set of computation operations that we are allowed to perform contains a group of unitary operations, 
generated by a set of ininitesimal generators with a large cardinality. he state space of m identical bosons can be 
expressed as a symmetric subspace of a Hilbert space  = ⊗ Hm internal spatial, where internal and spatial denote 
the space for the internal degrees of freedom and the spatial modes of the m identical bosons respectively. Due to 
the indistinguishability of the bosons, the state of the system is invariant under permutation of particles, and 
hence the system can only occupy states within the subspace of m which respect this permutational symmetry. 
he computational operations, which act only on spatial, must respect this symmetry, and hence the ininitesimal 
generators of the group of such operations are permutation-invariant. We proceed to elucidate the structure of 
these ininitesimal generators. Each boson can be in one of m possible spatial modes, and hence there are m2 
generalized Pauli operators each of dimension m that act non-trivially on the spatial degree of freedom of each 
boson. Let the corresponding Hermitian and non-Hermitian generalized Pauli operators constitute the sets i 
and ′i  respectively. We construct a set  ′i that contains a maximal number of linearly independent operators from 
∪+ ∈ ′ − ∈ ′
† †{ } { }P P P P P P( ): ( ):i i i12 2  . he Hermitian set ∪= ′i i iB B C  then comprises of m2 ininitesi-
mal generators of the unitary group operating non-trivially only on the spatial modes on the i-th boson. he 
ininitesimal generators of group of computation operations are then symmetric sums of the m-fold tensor prod-
uct of elements from i , with each such element corresponding to one boson. he number of such symmetric 
sums is exactly the number of ways to distribute m indistinguishable spatial labels (because of the requirement of 
permutation-invariance) among m2 distinct elements of i, which is  + −



m m
m
12 . Hence the set of computation 
operations G that we can perform contains a group of unitary operators, GC, generated by a set of ininitesimal 
generators with a cardinality of at least 



+ − 


≥ ≥ −m m
m
m e m1 /
m
m
m m2 ( )
!
1
m2
. If we denote the set of all inini-
tesimal generators of the spatial part of GC by C, then I Rθ θ= ⊗ ∑ ∈∈G i c{ exp( ): }C c C c cint , where int is the 
identity operator on the internal states of the m bosons. he computation subgroup GC intuitively corresponds to 
a model of computation with interacting bosons of d species in which the computation only depends on the spa-
tial labels of the bosons.
Contained within GC are unitaries generated by the following ininitesimal generators:
∑=
α
α α
=
−l ˆ ˆ†C a a: ,
(2)
x y
d
x y,
0
1
, ,
for 1 ≤ x, y ≤ m. These operators lCx y,  are infinitesimal generators for operations that are equivalent to 
beam-splitters for x ≠ y, and phase-shiters for x = y in the quantum optics setting. Since we can generate the 
phase-shiters and the beam-splitters as in Reck et al.29, these ininitesimal generators generate a dimension m 
unitary group isomorphic to U(m)30–32 from which the evaluator’s computation operations can be chosen. hese 
are the same elements used to construct those of the BosonSampling model. All particles in the BosonSampling 
model are indistinguishable (have the same internal states); the particles in our model however need not be indis-
tinguishable, because each particle can be chosen as a d-level system independently. If we were to ilter out parti-
cles with one of the d internal states, we are let with a system that is equivalent to d − 1 BosonSampling models 
by linearity of passive linear optics. This is a generalization of the insight used to encrypt BosonSampling 
instances in Rohde et al.26.
Hence our computation space includes a hard sampling problem as a special case. However, it is currently 
unknown whether our model allows for encoded universal computation on a space of size exponential in m.
Encoding scheme — For the encryption operation, a unitary operator  , is applied to the internal state of the m 
particles as is depicted in Fig. 1. Since   only acts on the internal states of the particles, provided that it operates 
identically on all particles, it commutes with our computation operations that act trivially on the internal states of 
the particles. In this section, we give a speciic choice   which enables non-trivial hiding of information.
evaluator
Figure 1. his igure shows Alice’s encoding scheme for m bosonic particles each in one of d internal states. 
Each particle has a spatial degree of freedom labeled by x. he encoding operation   is efected across the 
particles in a tensor product way. he evaluation operation is taken from the group G, which acts non-trivially 
only on the spatial modes of the m bosons, and can put multiple bosons in a single spatial mode. Post-
evaluation, the encryption is removed via the inverse encoding operation to reveal the evaluated plaintext.
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In what follows, we drop the spatial labels of the particles and make them implicit. We deine the computa-
tional basis states of each particle to be α  for α = 0, … , d − 1, and deine the discrete Fourier transform on d as
∑
pi αβ
β α=






.
α β=
−
F
d
i
d
1
exp
2
(3)
d
, 0
1
Denote the basis states of d in the Fourier transform basis as α α= FF , and deine the trigonometric terms 
cα(k) = cos(2piαk/d) and sα(k) = sin(2piαk/d) for arbitrary integers α and k. he generators of the encoding are, 
for = … 



k 1, ,
d
2
,
∑
∑
α α
α α
∆ =
+
=
∆ = −
−
=
α
α
α
α
−
=
−
+






−
=
−
l l
l l
l
l
L L
c k
L L
i
s k
2
( ) ,
2
( ) ,
(4)
k
k k d
F F
k d
k k d
F F
0
1
2
0
1
where lL is the cyclic shit operation on the internal state of each particle such that α α= +lL d1(mod ) . To 
simplify our calculations, we choose to express our generators in the following basis instead:
 ∑η=



− ∆ +



∆ + ∆












=






+






   
ℓ ℓ ℓ ℓ
H
d
c k s k
1
2 ( ) 2 ( ) ,
(5)
d
k
d
k k d
2
1
2
2
where η pi=
+ − AA cos( )1 ( 1)2
d
. It is easy to verify that in the Fourier transform basis, = ℓ ℓ
ℓ
H F F .
Data represented using the logical basis can be encrypted by choosing a key, κ κ κ= … −
G
( , , )d1 1 , where each κA 
is an integer chosen uniformly at random from the non-negative integers {0, … , m}, and applying the random 
unitary operation   on each particle, where
 ∑ φ=





=
−

ℓ
ℓ ℓ
i Hexp ,
(6)
d
1
1
and φ κ=
pi
+A Am
2
1
 are the secret random angles. It is convenient to think of   as a product of integer powers of 
=
pi
+

ℓ ℓ( )iHexp m
2
1
 , so that = …κ κ−−d1 1d1 1   .
Ater the encoding, computation can still be performed on the encrypted data using the operations described 
in the previous section. However, for an adversary that does not have access to κ
G
, the information encoded is 
obscured. Once the evaluation is completed, the output can be decrypted by applying †  on every particle to yield 
the processed plaintext. Surprisingly, with this simple encryption-decryption process, any quantum computation 
chosen from G which is performed on the encrypted state yields the same result when decrypted, as if it were 
performed on the unencrypted state. he result is an encryption scheme that admits privacy homomorphisms for 
operations chosen from G.
Our scheme works because the encryption operators afect only the internal states of the particles at each site, 
while the computation leaves the internal states of every particle invariant. In the particular encryption scheme 
we have chosen, the encryption operators generate an abelian group A that acts trivially on the spatial modes. 
Hence the evaluator can perform operations in the tensor product of the group G and the abelian group A.
Hidden information. Here we show that our quantum homomorphic scheme can hide a number of bits 
proportional to m. Without knowing the key, the ensemble is ρ
α α
 ˆ p{ , } where α α α α= …

( , , , )m1 2  denotes the 
plaintext, and the corresponding encrypted state is
∑ρ α α=
+
.
α
κ κ
−
… =
⊗ ⊗
−
 
ˆ
†
m
1
( 1)
( )
(7)
d
m
m m
1
, , 0d1 1
 
It is illuminating to look at the ensemble in the Fourier transform basis as here the encoding is diagonal. We can 
write ρ
α
ˆ  in the form ' β β∑ ′β β β β′∈ ′
 
   c, ,d
m  and the non-zero coeicients are those for which the number of A’s in β 
is equal to the number of A’s in β′  for all = … −A d1, , 1. Let  Oˆ( ) denote ⊗ ⊗ˆ†F OF( ) m m. hen
'
∑ ∏ρ β β δ β β= ′ × − ′α
β β
pi α β β
′∈
−
⋅ − ′
=
−   

 
  
ℓ
ℓ ℓˆ
d
e( )
1
(wt ( ) wt ( )),
(8)
m
i
d
d
,
2 ( )
0
1
d
m

where β

ℓwt ( ) is the Lee weight which counts the number of times A appears in the vector β

. he non-zero terms 
in Eq. (8) can be partitioned into sets labeled by integer partitions of m. Let Pm,d be the set of integer partitions of 
m into d (possibly empty) parts and let λ be a partition in Pm,d. In Eq. (8), strings for which all Lee weights are 
equal belong to the same partition λ. he entries in λ = (λ0, λ1, … , λd−1) give the number of times a particular 
element appears in β

. With this notation, we get
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
5SCIENTIFIC REPORTSȁ ?ǣ ? ? ? ? ?ȁǣ ? ?Ǥ ? ? ? ?Ȁ ? ? ? ? ?
 ∑ρ = Ψ Ψα
λ
λ λ
α
λ
α
∈

 
ˆ
d
R( )
1
,
(9)
m
Pm d,
where 
λ λ λ
=
…λ −( )R
m
, , , d0 1 1
 is the multinomial coeicient, and
∑ βΨ = | 〉λ
α
λ β β λ
pi
α β
=
= … −
− ⋅ 
 
 
R
e
1
,
(10)
t
j d
i
d
:w ( )
0, , 1
2
j j
which is invariant under permutation of the particles.
heorem 1 For all probability distributions 
α
p  over plaintexts α

, the accessible information of the encoding, with-
out knowing the key, is upper bounded by mlog !
2
 bits when Alice sends m d-level particles.
Proof: First, we observe that the elements of α α = … −d{ , 0, , 1} are related by powers of lL. Since lL is unitary 
and commutes with the encoding  , it must be that ρ
α
ˆS ( ) is the same for all α

. For simplicity, we analyze ρGˆS ( )
0
:

∑
∑
ρ ρ=
=



|Ψ 〉〈Ψ |



=






+



|Ψ 〉〈Ψ |



=






λ
λ
λ λ
λ
λ
λ
λ λ
λ
∈
∈
G G
G G
G G
ˆ ˆ
{ }
{ }
S S
S
R
d
H
R
d
R
d
S
H
R
d
( ) ( ( ))
,
(11)
P
m
m
P
m
m
0 0
0 0
0 0
m d
m d
,
,
where we have used the orthogonality of the diferent partitions labelled by λ in the third equality33, and that 
|Ψ 〉〈Ψ |λ λ
G G
0 0  has rank one in the inal equality. Similar arguments can be made for ρ ρ= ∑α α α
  ˆ ˆp ,
'
'
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
ρ =



Ψ 〉〈Ψ



≤



Ψ 〉〈Ψ



=






+



Ψ 〉〈Ψ



.
α
α
λ
λ
λ
α
λ
α
α λ
λ
λ
α
λ
α
λ
λ
λ
α
λ
α
λ
α
∈ ∈
∈ ∈


 

 

 
ˆ
{ }
S S p
R
d
S
d
R
d
H
R
d
R
d
S
d
( )
1
1
(12)
P
m
m
P
m
m m m
d
m
m d
d
m
m d
,
,
he inequality above occurs because applying a channel that randomizes over α

, by applying a random power of lL to each particle, symmetrizes the probability distribution 
α
p  to the uniform distribution, but cannot decrease 
entropy. he second term of Eq. (12) obeys the identity
'
∑ ∑ β βΨ Ψ =
α
λ
α
λ
α
λ β β λ∈ =
= … −
 

 
 d R
1 1
,
(13)
m
t
j d
:w ( )
0, , 1
d
m
j j
and is hence a maximally mixed state in the partition labeled by λ with a rank of Rλ, with entropy at most 
≤λ λR mmax log log !2 2 . Using these facts and putting Eqs (11–13) together, we obtain a bound on the Holevo 
quantity of
χ ρ ≤
α α
 ˆ p m({ , }) log ! (14)2
which in turn bounds the accessible information.
Discussion
When m is large,
'χ ρ ≤ − + .
α α
 ˆ p m m m m({ , }) log
1
log 2
(log( ))
(15)2
and the gap, between the encoded information and the information accessible to an adversary, is at least
χ ρΓ = −
≈ + .
α α
→ →
−
ˆm d p
m d m m
log ({ , })
log ( / ) (log2) (16)
2
2
1
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hus if d = m and m mlog
2
 bits are encoded, this gap scales at least proportional to m. Moreover if =d mr
1
 for r in 
the open unit interval, the gap asymptotically approaches (1 − r) as a fraction of bits encoded. his is a signii-
cantly stronger security than that ofered by Rohde et al.26, while at the same time signiicantly extending the 
functionality by allowing computations beyond BosonSampling to be performed on the encrypted data, thus 
bringing us closer to the goal of achieving a quantum fully homomorphic encryption scheme. As our bound in 
Eq. (14) is independent of the probability distribution used for the encoding, the bound on the accessible infor-
mation holds even if the a priori distribution on the plaintext is not uniform.
Methods
he aim of this section is two-fold. First, to give the explicit form of the computation operators contained in GC 
which is strictly a subgroup of G. Second, to show that the encryption and computation operators of our QHE 
scheme commute.
L e t  ⊗ = span( )internal spatialH H K ,  w h e r e  #  i s  t h e  s e t  o f  a l l  s t a t e s  o f  t h e  f o r m 
α α α⊗ ⊗ … ⊗x x x, , ,m m1 1 2 2  where αj ∈ {0, 1, … , d − 1} and xj ∈ {1, 2, … , m} are the internal and spatial 
labels respectively. Hence the Hilbert space of m bosons lies within the tensor product space ⊗ … ⊗ ,m1   
where each   = ⊗j j jinternal, spatial,  denotes the Hilbert space of each boson with the subscript j as a label on 
the j-th boson, and is equal to  ⊗internal spatial. As our particles are identical bosons, the state of the m particles 
must be invariant under permutation of the labels of the particles. hus, the set of all possible states for our 
m-bosons is the symmetric subspace of  ⊗ … ⊗ m1 .
For our scheme, the computation operators act only on the spatial mode of the particles. Each bosonic particle 
can be in one of m possible spatial modes, and hence there are m2 generalized Pauli operators each of dimension 
m that act non-trivially on the spatial degree of freedom of each boson. In order to deine the ininitesimal gen-
erators of the computation, let us irst deine the multi-qudit generalized Pauli operator given a tensor product of 
generalized Pauli operators34. he set of generalized Pauli operators of size m can be deined as
= ∈ … −X Z a b m{ : , {0, , 1}}, (17)a b(
where = ∑ +=
−X k m k: 1 modk
m
0
1 , and = ∑
pi
=
−Z e k k: k
m ik m
0
1 2 / . Define   and ′ as the Hermitian and 
non-Hermitian operators in (  respectively. Now let  jspatial,  denote the identity operator on the Hilbert space 
jspatial,  and deine 
ˬ
jspatial,  to be the identity operator on the internal subsystem of all the bosons except for the 
j-th boson, given explicitly by

 
   
 
=









⊗ … ⊗ =
⊗ … ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ … ⊗ ≤ <
⊗ … ⊗ =
.− +
−
ˬ
j
j m
j m
1
2
(18)
patial j
patial patial m
patial patial j patial j patial m
patial patial m
s ,
s ,2 s , ,
s ,1 s , 1 s , 1 s , ,
s ,1 s , 1,
For every generalized Pauli operator (∈P , we deine ω = ⊗ˬP P( )j jspatial,  to be the multi-particle operator that 
only acts non-trivially on the spatial degree of freedom of the j-th particle where it applies the operator 
P. Correspondingly deine the Hermitian and non-Hermitian operators on particle j as  j and  ′j respectively. 
hen our multi-particle generalized Pauli has the form
σ ω ω= …P P( ) ( ), (19)m m1 1
where … ∈P P, , m1 ( .
he generalized Pauli operators (  are not always Hermitian, but the ininitesimal generators of unitary oper-
ations must be Hermitian. To generate unitary elements, we would have to make the non-Hermitian operators of 
 ′j Hermitian. Let ′j  denote a subset of  ∪+ ∈ ′ − ∈ ′† †{ } { }P P P P P P( ): ( ):j i j12 2  comprising of a maximal 
number of linearly independent elements. hen an orthogonal set of Hermitian operators in the Hilbert-Schmidt 
inner product that acts on the j-th particle is ∪= ′j j jB B C .
For a given m-tuple of operators, = …
G
b b b( , , )m1 , ∈b j j , we deine the corresponding symmetric sum,
∑ ∏ ω=
pi
pi
∈ =
Gc b( ),
(20)
b
S j
m
j j
1
( )
m
where Sm denotes the symmetric group of order m. he set of = = … ∈
GG{ }C c b b b b: ( , , ),b m j j1  denotes the set 
of all ininitesimal generators for the spatial part of GC. he group GC of unitary operators generated from C that 
is contained within G is
I R∑θ θ=





= ⊗






∈




∈
G g i cexp : ,
(21)
C
c C
c cint
where  = ⊗ =jm jint 1 int ,  is the identity operator on the internal state of the m bosons. It is in this sense that the 
ininitesimal generators in C generate the group GC. he cardinality of C is precisely the number of ways to dis-
tribute m indistinguishable spatial labels among m2 distinct elements of j  which is  + −



m m
m
12 . Any encryp-
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tion operator i  that we consider can be written as a linear operator on the tensor product space  ⊗int spatial 
where
= ⊗i , (22)spatial 
where spatial is the identity operator on the spatial subsystem of the m bosons. his trivially commutes with all 
computation operators from GC, as can be seen from Eq. (21).
he no-go theorem of Yu et al.25 implies that for perfect information theoretic security, the size of the encod-
ing must scale with the number of bits required to the computation to be performed on the encrypted data. 
For extremely limited classes of computation, such as only applying Pauli operators, this is trivially satisiable 
with an encoding that scales linearly with the input size. However, when the set of possible computation has 
super-exponential cardinality, as is the case for universal classical or quantum computation, perfect security can-
not be achieved. Our results, then, can be seen as evidence that an equivalent no-go theorem does not hold when 
the security demand is relaxed.
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